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Another Nail in the Coffin of Religious Freedom?:
Christian Legal Society v Martinez
CHARLES J RUSSO AND WILLIAM E THRO*
Introduction
Amid on-going battles over the place of religious
groups and even religion itself in the marketplace
of ideas known as American public education, the
United States Supreme Court added fuel to the fire
in Christian Legal Society v Martinez.1 In Christian
Legal Society, the Court affirmed an order of the
Ninth Circuit,2 agreeing that officials at a public law
school in California had the authority to implement
a policy effectively marginalising religious freedom
by requiring an on-campus religious group to admit
all-comers from the student body, including those
who disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of
becoming a recognised student organisation.
On remand for consideration of whether law
school officials applied the all-comers policy
selectively to the Christian Legal Society (CLS), the
Ninth Circuit joined the Supreme Court in placing
another nail in the coffin of religious freedom.3 In
so doing, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim of the
CLS on the ground that organisational leaders failed
to preserve their argument that law school officials
selectively applied the policy for appeal, making it
apparently the only public institution of higher
learning in the United States with such a policy in
place.
Whether Christian Legal Society is a victory for
those who think that students should not be subject
to discrimination due to their religious beliefs or a
setback for religious freedom depends, of course,
on one’s point of view.4 Regardless of how one
interprets Christian Legal Society, it has the
potential to change the landscape of religious
freedom in the United States dramatically insofar as
officials can potentially block faith-based groups
from public facilities. In light of the ramifications
for religious freedom that Christian Legal Society
raises for the United States and the United
Kingdom, the remainder of this article is divided
into two major parts. The first section reviews the
facts, judicial history, and the opinions in the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Christian Legal Society.
The second part reflects on what Christian Legal
Society means for religious freedom in educational
settings. The article rounds out with a brief
conclusion.
Christian Legal Society v Martinez
Facts
Over a period of 10 years beginning with the
1994–1995 academic year and through the
2003–2004 school year, the CLS was a Registered
Student Organization (RSO) at Hastings College of
Law, a branch of the University of California’s
public system of higher education. In order to
become RSOs, organisations had to comply with
the law school’s non-discrimination policy,
modeled after state law, forbidding groups from
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1 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
2 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
795 (2009).
3 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
4 As Chief Justice Roberts commented during oral
argument, but the majority failed to acknowledge, there is
a fundamental difference between discrimination based
on status (race, sex, age, and sexual orientation) and
discrimination based on belief (religion or political views).
Oral Argument Transcript, Christian Legal Soc’y v
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), at 44.
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discriminating on an array of criteria including
religion and sexual orientation. RSOs benefit by
being able to use the law school’s name, logo, and
bulletin boards to post materials, email system for
mailings, office space, voice mail, and travel funds.5
In September of 2004, CLS’s officers
unsuccessfully requested travel funds to attend the
organisation’s annual national conference. Later in
the same month, university officials met with the
officers of CLS and, due to changes in the Society’s
national by laws, informed the group’s leadership
that it appeared to be non-compliant with the Law
School’s non-discrimination policy.6 University
officials were particularly concerned with the
policy’s provisions on religion and sexual
orientation even though no non-Christian, gay,
lesbian, or bisexual students sought to join or
attend meetings.7 Officials thus directed the CLS’s
officers to open the group’s membership to
all-comers, regardless of their beliefs or sexual
orientation. When the leadership of the CLS refused
to change the membership requirements, university
officials denied their request for RSO status. Still,
the CLS remained active at the law school during
that academic year, sponsoring activities including
Bible-study meetings, a lecture on Christian faith,
and social activities.
Judicial history
Trial Court
The CLS unsuccessfully filed suit in a federal trial
court in California, charging university officials with
violating the First Amendment rights of its members
to expressive association, free speech, and free
exercise of religion along with denying its rights to
due process and equal protection. The trial court
initially granted the Law School’s motion to dismiss
the Establishment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection Clause claims but permitted the CLS
leave to amend its equal protection claim.8 In
5 Pursuant to its policy,
The College is committed to a policy against legally
impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory
practices. All groups, including administration, faculty,
student governments, College-owned student residence
facilities and programs sponsored by the College, are
governed by this policy of non-discrimination. The
College’s policy on non-discrimination is to comply fully
with applicable law.
… Hastings College of the Law shall not discriminate
unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.
This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access
and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and
activities.
5 Petition for Certiorari, at 4, Christian Legal Soc’y v
Martinez, No. 08–1371 (U.S. May 5, 2009).
6 The Christian Legal Society requires all members to:
affirm a commitment to the group’s foundational
principles by signing the national Christian Legal Society
Statement of Faith. A shared devotion to Jesus Christ is
reflected in the Statement of Faith, the affirmation of
which indicates a member’s commitment to beliefs
commonly regarded as orthodox in the Protestant
evangelical and Catholic traditions. An individual raised
in a faith other than Christianity is eligible for voting
membership if he or she affirms the Statement’s orthodox
Christian tenets. Conversely, a person raised as a Christian
is not eligible if he or she no longer can affirm the
Statement of Faith.
Petition for Certiorari, at 7, Christian Legal Soc’y v
Martinez, No. 08–1371 (U.S. May 5, 2009). With respect
to sexual conduct, the Christian Legal Society’s
requirements are clear:
A person who advocates or unrepentantly engages in
sexual conduct outside of marriage between a man and a
woman is not considered to be living consistently with
the Statement of Faith and, therefore, is not eligible for
leadership or voting membership. A person’s mere
experience of same-sex or opposite-sex sexual attraction
does not determine his or her eligibility for leadership or
voting membership. Christian Legal Society individually
addresses each situation that arises in a sensitive Biblical
fashion.
6 Ibid, at 8.
7 As to sexual conduct, the CLS’s policy stipulated:
A person who advocates or unrepentantly engages in
sexual conduct outside of marriage between a man and a
woman is not considered to be living consistently with
the Statement of Faith and, therefore, is not eligible for
leadership or voting membership. A person’s mere
experience of same-sex or opposite-sex sexual attraction
does not determine his or her eligibility for leadership or
voting membership. Christian Legal Society individually
addresses each situation that arises in a sensitive Biblical
fashion.
7 Ibid, at 8.
8 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v Kane,
2005 WL 850864 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
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response to the CLS’s amended equal protection
claim, both parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on the free speech, expressive
association, free exercise, and equal protection
claims. In a lengthy, unreported order, the trial
court granted the university’s cross-motion for
summary judgment on all counts.9 In positing that
university officials uniformly enforced the policy,
the court rejected the CLS’s claims that officials
infringed on its constitutional rights.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed
in favor of the university in a two-sentence
memorandum.10 The court observed that the parties
stipulated that the law school imposed an open
membership rule on all student groups, requiring
them to accept all individuals as members,
including those who disagreed with a group’s
mission. Relying on its own precedent in a K-12
case (that is, a case involving a public high school),
Truth v Kent School District,11 wherein it ruled that
school board officials did not violate the Equal
Access Act12 or a Bible Study Club’s First
Amendment rights by requiring it to admit
non-believers, the court was convinced that the
policy was viewpoint neutral and reasonable.
Supreme Court
Opinion of the Court
On appeal, a divided Supreme Court, in a 5:4
decision written by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed that
the CLS had to admit all-comers, even those who
disagree with its missions and goals.13 At the outset,
the Court voiced its reluctance to deny RSOs access
to university facilities based on their viewpoints.14
However, conceding that Christian Legal Society
presented a novel question, the Court delineated
the issue at bar as whether ‘a public law school
[may] condition its official recognition of a student
group—and the attendant use of school funds and
facilities—on the organisation’s agreement to open
eligibility for membership and leadership to all
students?’15
After recounting the facts, the Supreme Court
thought it necessary to resolve CLS’s preliminary
question of whether the policy was designed to
prohibit discrimination or require RSOs to accept
all-comers. Due to joint stipulations by the parties
to the effect that they focused on the latter issue,
the Court refused to review the policy as written.16
Having disposed of the threshold question of
what policy was at issue, the Supreme Court
considered its constitutionality.17 The CLS advanced
two separate arguments in disputing the policy.
First, because the recognition of RSOs constitutes a
limited public forum,18 a topic discussed below,19
the CLS maintained that law school officials could
not deny access to RSOs that disagree with the law
school. Second, since the law school policy
required the CLS to accept members who disagreed
with its core beliefs, it contended that the law
9 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Calif. v Kane,
2006 WL 997217 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
10 Christian Legal Soc’y v Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th
Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
11 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 551
F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2889
(2009).
12 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071 et seq. Essentially codifying Widmar v
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which protected the access
rights of a religious group on a university campus, the Act
requires officials in public secondary schools receiving
federal financial assistance and that permit non-curriculum
related student groups to meet during non-instructional
time to grant access to religious groups. The Act does
allow officials to exclude groups if their meetings
materially and substantially interfere with the orderly
conduct of school activities. The Court upheld the Act in
Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990). For a commentary in this case, see
C J Russo and D L Gregory ‘Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools v Mergens: A Case
Analysis’ (1990) 17(1) Religion and Public Education
18–20.
13 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
14 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, at 2984.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, at 2984 n 12. (‘Our decisions make clear, and the
parties agree, that Hastings, through its [recognised
student organisation] program, established a limited public
forum.’)
19 See, below, n 26–34 and accompanying text.
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school violated its right to freedom of expressive
association.20 If anything, the CLS charged that the
government qua officials at the public law school,
may intrude on the freedom of association only ‘by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms.’21 The Court
rejected the notion that something less than strict
scrutiny, a standard of constitutional review
described below, should apply to freedom of
association claims.
In matters dealing with equal protection, the
Supreme Court had devised three tests, the first two
of which are the more significant. The general
constitutional test for acceptability of classification
criteria is whether they are rationally related to
legitimate governmental concerns. The Court has
declared that ‘. . . if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.’22
Under this ‘rational relations’ standard, courts apply
a strong, but rebuttable, presumption that criteria
established through the legislative process are
constitutional.
On the other hand, courts apply ‘strict scrutiny’ if
legislation or the actions of governmental officials
impact on fundamental constitutional rights such as
those identified in the Constitution (such as
freedom of religion or speech) or that are implicitly
there as declared by the Court or disadvantage
members by categorising individuals based on
constitutionally ‘suspect’ factors such as race. When
courts apply ‘strict scrutiny’ they are unlikely to
uphold classifications unless they are sufficiently
narrowly tailored to achieve compelling
governmental interests.23
In the infrequently applied middle ground, the
Supreme Court has adopted an intermediate
standard of review that is not as difficult for the
government to meet as the compelling interest test
but which involves less deference to legislation
than the rational relations test. Under this test, the
Court refuses to uphold classifications unless they
bear ‘substantial relationships’ to ‘important’
governmental interests.24
The CLS had asked the Supreme Court to
consider each of its arguments separately. Yet, since
it believed that the two arguments effectively
merged, the Court responded that ‘it makes little
sense to treat [the CLS’s] speech and association
claims as discrete.’25 Before reviewing the Supreme
Court’s analysis, it is worth noting that the Court
recognises three kinds of fora, two of which were
not at issue in CLS.
In traditional public fora, which are subject to
strict scrutiny, government officials may only
impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions26 that are narrowly tailored to achieve
compelling government interests.27 Regardless,
government officials cannot practice viewpoint
discrimination.28 At the other end of the spectrum,
public property such as a classroom,29 ‘is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public
communication.’30 Since non-public fora are subject
20 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
21 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
22 Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
23 For perhaps the most notorious example of the Supreme
Court’s allowing a race-based classification to survive
strict scrutiny, albeit not in a school setting, see
Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding the placing of Japanese-Americans in
protective custody camps during World War II based on
their ancestry).
24 The case moist closely associated with this standard is
Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh’g denied, 458
U.S. 1131 (1982), even though the majority did not
clearly indicate that it was applying this test (allowing
children whose parents were not documented to attend
public school).
25 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
26 Perry Educ. Ass’n v Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983).
27 Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
28 Carey v Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980).
29 Walz ex rel. Walz v Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ.,
342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936
(2004).
30 Perry Educ. Ass’n v Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983).
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to less rigorous scrutiny than traditional open or
designated public fora,31 the government can
enforce regulations reserving fora for their intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, but these
‘must be “reasonable in light of the purpose served
by the forum.” ’32 Additionally, state officials cannot
impose limitations in non-public fora designed to
suppress expression with which they disagree.33
While schools are generally non-public fora during
school hours, once classes end, the type of fora that
buildings become depends on local policies and
practices with the result that the Supreme Court has
twice found that since school officials in K-12
settings created limited open fora, they could not
exclude religious groups.34
The Supreme Court offered three reasons for
resolving the constitutional issues under limited
public forum analysis. First, the Court feared that
utilising limited public forum analysis for the free
speech claim and strict scrutiny analysis for the
freedom of association charge might have lead to
inconsistent results. Put another way, the Court
feared that the actions of law school officials might
have been constitutional under limited public
forum analysis but unconstitutional under the
freedom of expressive association review. Second,
the Court thought that applying the freedom of
expressive association standard to the recognition of
RSOs would have invalidated a defining
characteristic of limited public fora, that the
government may reserve fora for certain types of
groups or purposes. Third, and perhaps most
significantly, the Court interpreted access to the
limited public forum as ‘effectively a state
subsidy.’35 Insofar as the CLS had the choice of
accepting individuals who disagreed with its values
or forgo the subsidy that comes with RSO status,
the Court maintained that it was not compelled to
accept those who disagree. As far as the Court was
concerned, this choice distinguished the case at bar
from suits where the law compelled admission of
those who disagree.36
At the heart of its limited public forum analysis,
the Supreme Court asserted that since it was not
beginning with a tabula rasa it was necessary to
review the three earlier cases in which it resolved
disputes between universities and student groups
seeking RSO status. In remanding Healy v James37
for further consideration the Court pointed out that
campus officials had the right to forbid a group
from organising a chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society, a student political action group
that often displayed violent propensities, on campus
unless they were willing to abide by the university’s
reasonable campus laws. In Widmar v Vincent,38
the Court noted that it entered a judgment in favor
of a student group, granting it access to university
facilities after officials singled out their religious
purpose in attempting to exclude the organisation
31 For an interesting case, admittedly not involving
education, illustrating the variety of issues over which
Americans fight for religious freedom, see Byrne v
Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010). The court reasoned
that since Vermont created a nonpublic forum by
allowing drivers to purchase ‘vanity’ license plates and
creating their own messages, officials violated the
motorist’s rights by denying him the opportunity to
display the Christian reference to the Gospel of John 3.16,
‘Yes, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son,
that whoever believes in him may not die but have
eternal life’ (New American Bible), ‘JN36TN,’ on his
plates. The court explained that the refusal violated the
driver’s First Amendment rights insofar as it excluded
motorists who wished to comment on otherwise
permissible subjects such as personal philosophy, beliefs,
and values due to the fact that they sought to do so from
a religious viewpoint.
32 Good News Club v Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
106–107 (2001) (quoting Cornelius v NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
33 Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788 (1985).
34 See Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), on remand, 17 F.3d 1425 (2d
Cir. 1994); for a commentary on this case, see R D
Mawdsley and C J Russo, ‘Lamb’s Chapel Revisited’
(1998) 64(11) School Business Affairs 44–45. See also,
Good News Club v Milford Cent. Sch., op cit n 32; for a
commentary on this case, see C J Russo and R D
Mawdsley, ‘And the Wall Keeps Tumbling Down: The
Supreme Court Upholds Religious Liberty in Good News
Club v Milford Central School’ (2001) 157 Education Law
Reports 1.
35 Ibid, at 2986.
36 Ibid, at 2986 n 14.
37 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
38 Op cit n 14.
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from meeting on camps. Finally, in Rosenberger v
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,39 the
Court reiterated how it forbade university officials
from withholding benefits from a student
newspaper simply due to its Christian perspective.
The Court highlighted that in these cases it refused
to let student groups be subject to discrimination in
a limited public forum because of their viewpoints.
The Supreme Court next identifies two questions
with regard to limited forum analysis. First, the
Court inquired whether the regulation was
reasonable. Second, the Court asked if the
regulation was viewpoint neutral. The Court
observed that while it owed no deference to
university officials, its review of First Amendment
rights ‘must be analysed in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.’40 Even
so, since the Court recognised that jurists lack the
skills and perspectives of educational leaders, it
purported to act cautiously.
Its professed desire to act cautiously
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court clearly agreed
with the four ‘justifications’ that law school officials
proffered in support of the disputed policy. First,
the Court asserted that the goal of the policy was to
ensure leadership, educational, and social
opportunities for all students. In this analysis, the
Court analogised that just as faculty members
cannot conduct classes for only students with
which they agree, so, too, organisations had to be
available to all who wish to join. The Court thought
that under this approach, students would not have
to provide funds to support organisations from
which excluded them as members. Second, the
Court agreed with the law school administrators
that the all-comers policy allowed campus officials
to police compliance with their non-discrimination
policy without having to consider a RSO’s reasons
for imposing conditions on membership.
Accordingly, the Court rejected the claim of CLS
that it excluded members for their conduct rather
than their beliefs, simply stating that it had declined
to make this distinction in cases of this nature.
Third, the Court agreed with the University that the
policy’s goal of bringing different groups together
‘encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning
among students,’41 a dubious sentiment at best in
light of concerns addressed in the discussion
below. Fourth, the Court ruled that the policy
effectively prohibited university officials from
providing public subsidies to groups such as the
CLS that engaged in conduct with which the people
of California disagreed.
Based on the preceding analysis, the Supreme
Court decided that the policy was reasonable based
on the availability of off-campus alternative
channels to the CLS once it lost RSO status. The
Court ascertained that although the CLS could not
rely on mandatory student activities fees, it was still
able to maintain a presence on campus through
conducting meetings and that attendance at these
events doubled.
The Supreme Court rejected the CLS’s
contentions that the all-comer policy was ‘frankly
absurd’42 and that ‘[t]here can be no diversity of
viewpoints in a forum . . . if groups are not
permitted to form around viewpoints.’43 The Court
also rebuffed the CLS’s concern that individuals
hostile to its mission could infiltrate its membership
if it had to admit all-comers as hypothetical,
responding that there was no history of this and
that an individual bent in such a ‘hostile take-over’
would not be elected by membership.
In what can only be described as a
disappointment to supporters of religious freedom,
the Court refused to consider what would have
happened if a ‘hostile take-over’ had been
organised by a group rather than an individual.
However, the Court suggested that the CLS was still
free to condition membership and eligibility for
leadership positions on neutral criteria such as
payment of dues, attendance at meetings designed
to help it continue to thrive. Of course, the Court
39 515 U.S. 819 (1995). For a commentary on this case, see
R D Mawdsley and C J Russo ‘Religion in Public
Education: Rosenberger Fuels an Ongoing Debate’ (1995)
103 Education Law Reports 13.
40 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988.
41 Ibid, at 2990.
42 Ibid, at 2992.
43 Ibid.
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added that, should such a situation have arisen,
then university officials would ‘presumably’ have to
revisit the policy.
As to whether the policy was viewpoint neutral,
the Supreme Court posited that ‘[i]t is, after all, hard
to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than
one requiring all student groups to accept
all-comers’44 because it contained no distinction
between and among groups in light of their
message or point of view. In rejecting the CLS’s
claim that the ‘nominally neutral’ policy had a
differential impact on it, the Court was convinced
that it was acceptable because as long as campus
officials did ‘not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from
regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy.’45
The Supreme Court thus concluded that insofar
as neither of the lower courts addressed whether
law school officials selectively enforced the
all-comers policy against the CLS, it had to remand
the dispute for further consideration over the extent
to which this question may still have been viable.
Concurring opinions
In the first of two brief concurrences, Justice
Stevens, in the final case on the Supreme Court,
attempted to rebut the rationale in Justice Alito’s
dissent which would have rejected the policy as
unconstitutional. Stevens retorted that while the
CLS had the right to limit its membership off
campus, the First Amendment did not require the
law school’s policy to grant it status as a RSO.46
In an even briefer concurrence, Justice Kennedy
declared that law school officials and the CLS
stipulated that there was no evidence of viewpoint
discrimination in the policy.47 Still, he indicated
that the result may have been different ‘if it were
shown that the all-comers policy was either
designed or used to infiltrate the group or challenge
its leadership in order to stifle its views,’48 an issue
that did not arise as the Ninth Circuit rejected the
CLS’ claims.
Dissenting opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts along
with Justices Scalia and Thomas, offered a spirited,
lengthy dissent making four points. First, the dissent
disputed the Court’s ‘misleading portrayal of this
case.’49 In particular, the dissenters maintained that
law school officials had not historically required
RSOs to admit all students, the denial of
recognition had significant consequences and that
the funding that the CLS sought was insignificant.
Second, the dissent contended that the Court’s
opinion was inconsistent with its own precedent in
Healy. Third, Justices maintained that the Court’s
previous limited public forum jurisprudence
precluded the adoption of the law school’s policy
as written. Fourth, the dissent demonstrated that
law school policy, as interpreted by the Court, was
neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral. Justice
Alito added that ‘[e]ven those who find Christian
Legal Society’s views objectionable should be
concerned about the way the group has been
treated by Hastings, the Court of Appeals, and now
this Court. I can only hope that this decision will
turn out to be an aberration.’50
Remand
On remand, the CLS unsuccessfully motioned to
have the case returned to the trial court for
consideration of its claim that law school officials
selectively applied its non-discrimination policy
against it.51 Rather, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
since the CLS failed to preserve its argument that
44 Ibid, at 2993.
45 Ibid, at 2994.
46 Ibid, at 2995 (Stevens, J, concurring).
47 Ibid, at 2998 (Kennedy, J, concurring)
48 Ibid, at 3000 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
49 Ibid, at 3001 (Alito, J, joined by Roberts, CJ, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ dissenting).
50 Ibid, at 3020 (Alito, J, joined by Roberts, CJ, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ, dissenting).
51 Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v Wu, 626
F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
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law school officials selectively applied the disputed
policy for appeal, it had no choice but to deny its
motion.
Reflections
In Christian Legal Society the Supreme Court
altered its limited-public forum jurisprudence both
by expanding the government’s ability to restrict
access to such a forum and by treating access as a
subsidy. In so deciding, the Court placed another
nail in the coffin of religious freedom because its
rationale grants educational officials greater rights to
impose restrictions on religious, and other, groups.
As a result of Christian Legal Society, a student
group that requires its members to pledge
conformity to orthodox Christian doctrines on
sexual morality has effectively been marginalised.
Moreover, as noted earlier, this was apparently the
first time in the history of Hastings or any public
American university that officials excluded an RSO
from campus based on its ‘sincerely held religious
belief.’52 As such, CLS raises four inter-related
implications for educational leaders and lawyers on
both sides of the Atlantic.
First and perhaps most obviously, policies at
public institutions may now require RSOs to admit
all who wish to join their ranks regardless of their
beliefs. In other words, while the First Amendment
and federal statutes such as the Equal Access Act53
still require school boards in K-12 settings to
recognise student religious groups, educators may
require clubs to admit members who disagree with
the core tenets of their philosophies.
In CLS the Supreme Court essentially repudiated
a case from New York in which the Second Circuit
reasoned that leaders of a Bible Study club formed
under the auspices of the Equal Access Act could
set their own criteria for electing leaders.54 In
allowing club leaders to establish their own
qualifications for officers, such as being a
‘practicing Christian,’ the court suggested that
individuals who disagreed with the group’s values
were free to form their own organisations. Since the
Supreme Court’s rejection of such an approach in
Christian Legal Society leaves the door open to
litigation over the status of the Equal Access Act, it
will be interesting to observe what occurs with
regard to religious freedom in K-12 settings.
If the fears of the student leaders of CLS were to
be realised, an upshot of the ruling in Christian
Legal Society, extending the ‘all-comers’
requirement to leadership positions, may be that
atheists may end up leading Fellowship of Christian
Athletes chapters while homophobes may seek to
become Presidents of Gay-Straight clubs. Certainly,
open membership policies may remove some
administrative headaches associated with student
groups that wish to limit who can join, regardless of
their bases for doing so. Yet, the all-comers policies
may create other concerns such as the fear voiced
by the CLS that outsiders may wish to join simply
in order to infiltrate their membership or to
undermine groups with which they disagree. It is
puzzling why the Court was so cavalier in refusing
to consider that such a ‘hostile takeover’ might
occur other to acknowledge that, with the
exception of Justice Kennedy, the remainder of the
Justices in the majority have either voted against
religious freedom in almost all cases or have a
predisposition to do so based on their judicial
philosophies.
52 See, eg Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of
Or. v Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (although noting
that courts can examine the nature of religious beliefs,
upholding the dismissal of drug counselors who ingested
peyote as part of a sacramental ritual in the Native
American Church, a legally organised religious movement
that was recognised by the federal government since a
generally applicable law that is neutral toward a religion
but has the effect of burdening a religious practice need
not be justified by a compelling government interest). The
Court also uses the term ‘deeply held religious belief.’
See, eg Johnson v Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974)
(upholding the denial of veteran’s benefits to a
conscientious objector who claimed that this violated his
right to religious freedom in light of the government’s
substantial interest in raising a military).
53 Op cit n 14.
54 Hsu v Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040 (1996). For a
commentary on this case, see C J Russo and R D
Mawdsley, ‘Hsu v Roslyn Union Free School District No.
3: An Update on the Rights of High School Students
Under the Equal Access Act’ (1997) 114 Education Law
Reporter 359.
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Considering that the judiciary and educational
leaders, whether in K-12 or higher education,
appear to display attitudes ranging from indifference
to hostility to religion,55 particularly Christianity, an
argument can be made that it was too facile of the
Supreme Court to reject the infiltration concerns of
CLS so readily. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment on remand requiring the CLS to include
members who do not share a commonality of
interest simply makes no sense from a wider
perspective because this may well snuff out a
diversity of perspectives that make educational
institutions whether at the secondary or tertiary
levels places of open and free inquiry. In fact,
Christian Legal Society may foster environments
that are antithetical to intellectual diversity because
it sends a message to people of faith and those with
unpopular views that their viewpoints are
unwelcomed and should either remain unspoken or
remain confined to the private dormitory rooms and
Facebook.56
In the wake of Christian Legal Society, students
of faith may choose to attend other institutions of
higher learning that are more friendly to, or at least
more tolerant of, their beliefs, even if they are in a
minority. Should such an exodus occur, it would be
the detriment of intellectual diversity on college
and university campuses. Concomitantly, for
secularists and those individuals who sway with the
prevailing political wind, the message is equally
clear that they may well be able to avoid engaging
in debate with people of faith with whom they
disagree. Even though American society is
increasingly heterogeneous in terms of race,
religion, language, and culture, the lack of
intellectual diversity on campuses when students
are unable to encounter those with whom they
disagree or who do not share the majority’s dogma
creates a situation that is detrimental to intellectual
development.
Third, in characterising access to a limited public
forum as a ‘subsidy’ in CLS, the Supreme Court
adopted a novel approach on the use of public
educational facilities whether in K-12 or higher
education. Christian Legal Society thus poses
questions about the future of the Equal Access Act,
a federal statute that grew out of a dispute from
higher education, Widmar v Vincent,57 wherein the
Supreme Court reasoned that university officials
could not exclude Christian students due to the
content of their speech. Prior to the enactment of
the Equal Access Act, educational officials,
particularly in K-12 settings, had broad, almost
absolute, authority to choose who could use their
facilities or whether student groups would be
recognised.
In the three decades since Widmar the Supreme
Court consistently ruled that if educational officials
allow some outside groups to use their facilities,
then they must allow all outside groups to do so for
similar purposes.58 The precedent set by Widmar is
now in some doubt due to Christian Legal Society
even though the cases litigated over the past thirty
years represent classic limited public forum
jurisprudence. Yet, the subsidy question is a
fundamentally different inquiry since the Court
determined in Christian Legal Society that RSOs no
longer have a right to a subsidy. Put another way, if
courts categorise access to educational facilities as
‘subsidies,’ by allowing selected groups to use
space at presumably discounted prices, then
educators at all levels are likely to have broad
authority to refuse access to religious groups and
may have the unintended consequence of
excluding groups based on their religious beliefs.
Third, in a closely related point, CLS allows
educational officials to restrict access to limited
public fora such as auditoria and stadia. While
school boards and administrators in public
institutions of higher education, like all
governmental officials, always had the authority to
bar activities from their limited public fora, CLS
allows officials to deny access to groups if they
condition membership based on their beliefs.55 For a discussion of issues on point, see C J Russo ‘Judicial
“hostility to all things religious in public life” or Healthy
Separation of Religion and Public Education?’ (2008) 35(2)
Religion and Education 78–94.
56 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2991–92.
57 Op cit n 40.
58 Lamb’s Chapel, op cit n 34; Milford, op cit note 34.
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Consequently, educational officials may require
outside groups seeking to rent halls for speeches or
films to have open membership policies. Since such
a rule excludes churches and political
organisations, educational officials may avoid some
of the difficult issues surrounding church and state
as well as questions involving the use of public
facilities for partisan campaign activities by limiting
access.
In seeking to avoid one type of controversy,
others may emerge in K-12 school systems. For
instance, if educational leaders adopt all-comers’
policies, their actions may have the unintended
consequence of galvanising taxpayers with strong
religious beliefs into protesting that they, or their
children, are being deprived of access to publicly
funded facilities due to their faiths. Adopting an
all-comers approach may be costly to school boards
in terms of lost good will as citizens vote to deny
operating funds via tax increases when levies are
needed to maintain school activities. While not
suggesting that parents should have a ‘heckler’s
veto’59 in all cases, educational leaders whether in
K-12 or higher education, should think twice about
placing restrictions on access especially since
individuals who disagree with groups can form
their own organisations. At the same time,
conditioning access to facilities for religious groups
based on their stances with regard to lifestyle
choices of potential members is something of a
slippery slope. Insofar as it is unclear where such
litmus tests will end as opponents may seek to bar
people of faith from being able to express their
beliefs in public places over other issues with
which they disagree, then officials should proceed
with caution.60
Fourth, since the Supreme Court has granted
broad deference to the judgment of higher
education officials about institutional policies, one
would expect a similar outcome in the K-12
context. While this development may make it easier
for officials in K-12 schools to prevail in litigation
challenging their educational policy-making, it
ultimately may undermine efforts to foster
communities of inclusiveness and tolerance. As
reflected by the growth in home schooling and
other alternative form of education such as charter
schools in the United States, increasing numbers of
parents of faith distrust public schools in light of
their perceptions that their deeply held religious
values are unwelcome. Requiring Christian groups
to include non-Christians as a condition of using
public facilities may reinforce this belief. In
addition, revising facilities-use policies so that
Churches and political groups may not use public
school property arguably sends a message of
isolation that public officials may not wish to
endorse,61 particularly if they are taxpayers who
help to fund public education.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the CLS’s appeal
that university officials selectively enforced the
all-comer’s policy does not mean that the fight over
access to facilities and membership criteria in
student organisations is over. In fact, Christian Legal
Society may serve as the opening salvo in a new
front in the battle for religious freedom. More
specifically, if clubs can make selective
enforcement claims or can demonstrate that
individuals who disagree with their core values
59 See Milford, op cit n 34, at 119 (2001) (permitting a
religious group to use public school facilities, noting that
the Supreme Court is unwilling ‘to employ Establishment
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto, in
which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed on
the basis of what . . . members of the audience might
misperceive’).
60 See, eg Abortion Rights Mobilization v United States
Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918 (1990) (refusing to
disturb an order of the Second Circuit that, on remand
from the Supreme Court, ruled that a pro-abortion group
lacked standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the
Roman Catholic Church based on its pro-life teachings).
61 On three occasions, the first of which was in higher
education while the latter two were in public schools, the
Supreme Court ruled that once educational officials in
public institutions allow various groups to meet in their
facilities, they cannot exclude religious organisations
based on the religious content of their speech. See
Widmar v Vincent, op cit n 14. Lamb’s Chapel v Center
Moriches Union Free School Dist., op cit n 36. Good
News Club v Milford Cent. Sch., op cit n 34. See also op
cit n 14.
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seek to engage in what can be described as ‘hostile
takeovers,’ then the door is open to litigation as
Justice Kennedy suggested. Thus, post Christian
Legal Society disputes bear watching because they
may have a significant impact on the way in which
officials at all levels can regulate the use of
educational facilities and whether their actions will
advance or inhibit the fundamental right of religious
freedom.
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